This expansion of government's responsibilities has important implications for environmental decisionmaking. Part I of this Article argues that the use of sophisticated mathematical and biological models distinguishes modern administrative experts from their Roosevelt-era predecessors. These models distance a modern agency's reasoning from ordinary experience and insulate regulatory decisions from generalist review. Appellate courts have responded by broadening the scope of judicial review. However, this response threatens the viability of the traditional model of administrative law, which is based on the assumption that courts will defer to agencies in matters of substance. The simplest reply to this threat is to environmental decisions. The New Deal did not require agency analysts to solve the partial differential equations governing the diffusion of pollutants in air and water, to manipulate epidemiological data, or to investigate the mutagenic effects of industrial chemicals. It called instead for learning through practical experience about the operations of industry and government. 1 3 As James Landis put it, the crying need was for "men bred to the facts.""' Moreover, the statutes defining a modern agency's mission no longer map the boundaries of real institutional authority. 15 Modern environmental statutes are diffuse. They require regulators to predict and control the full spectrum of unwanted side effects of industrial activities. 1 " These statutes authorize agency participation in large-scale research and project development; 1 7 they require regulators to anticipate the environmental consequences of major federal decisions. 1 8 Roosevelt-era legislation had no such scope. Quintessential New Deal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) primarily had licensing and enforcement powers. The New Deal Deal reformers and conservative opponents of administrative government. In the same year, Congress established the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the first federal agency authorized to engage in research, development, and industrial production. There could have been no more stringent test of the New Deal model than the one it underwent as the AEC developed its military and commercial programs. The Commission combined scientific, engineering, and managerial skills of the highest order. Reactor development was pushed ahead and siting and safety decisions were made, often with minimal impetus and direction from policy levels. See 1 R. HEWLETT & 0. ANDERSON, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 227-54 (1969). Yet the Commission did not achieve the success the New Deal had promised. Its arcane subject, the national security implications of its actions, and the domestic political tensions of the postwar era led to a decisionmaking process dominated by highly committed engineers and scientists and closed to effective review by outsiders. When the results of that process were evaluated, in the era of commercial nuclear power, it was found that the agency had failed to establish quality control in manufacturing, to train personnel adequately, to promote "learning by doing," and generally to establish a safe and efficient nuclear power system. 
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Congress did not instruct the NLRB to theorize about the behavior of management or explore new phenomena in the labor market. Nor did it ask the SEC to analyze the stochastic subtleties of speculative movements in securities prices. Even the Federal Communications Commission, at the cutting edge of technology, was limited in its responsibilities,' 9 with only implicit statutory encouragement to involve itself in research 20 and none for direct involvement in development.
In sum, to assure air and water quality, the safety of complex systems, workplace health and safety, and the reliability of food and drugs, the modern agency must model ecological and economic systems, interpret and evaluate scientific data, and forecast the future. 2 In so doing, agencies with a specified mission often take on responsibilities beyond those (establishing scientific review body charged with advising EPA of probable effects of national ambient air quality standards); id. § 7411(f)(2)(B) (EPA to consider, in determining priorities for promulgating air quality standards for major stationary sources, extent to which pollution "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare"); id. § 7521(a)(1) (same for risks from motor vehicle emissions); id. § 7620 (construction of models aiding the prevention of air quality deterioration); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (1982) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authorized to order "wheeling" of electric power transmission services upon predictions of improved energy conservation, energy efficiency, or reliability of power systems).
Courts granted them by enabling legislation. 2 2 This expansion of administrative power is due, in part, to the success of the environmental movement. 23 Yet in leading us beyond the New Deal, environmentalists have shattered the old political equilibrium. By shifting the center of gravity of the administrative state from the articulation of social and economic goals to concern with the implications of new technology and scientific discovery, 2 4 they have encouraged the use of sophisticated techniques distant from ordinary experience and blurred the boundaries of institutional authority, thereby reopening the question of how to assure effective independent oversight of technological decisions.
II.
If it were possible to separate the technical from the political, ethical, and legal, the New Deal's assumptions and the use of expertise that those assumptions entail might well go unquestioned. 5 23. The success of the environmental movement may be read as a reaction to the New Deal's faith in expertise. In some respects, the reaction was extreme: Authors condemned whole technologies as dangerous, see, e.g., P. BRODEUR, THE ZAPPING OF AMERICA (1977) (health risks of radiofrequency and microwave radiation); H. CALDICOTT, NUCLEAR MADNESS (1978) (health risks of nuclear power (2) A belief that environmental disputes are best settled by informal negotiation, divorced from the formal constraints of the adversary process and insulated from the implicit restrictions governing scientific research. This view is prevalent in discussions of how to treat the unwanted side effects of familiar technologies. Managing non-nuclear hazardous wastes and choosing sites for dams are typical problems to which a negotiation approach has been applied. See L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVI-RONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (forthcoming).
(3) A belief that existing institutions and institutional relationships should be redesigned to encourage greater cooperation among the legal and scientific communities. See Markey, Law and Science-Equal but Separate, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 619, 621-22 (1983). This view is usually expressed in environmental controversies involving advanced technologies, such as nuclear power and air pollution control.
The crucial distinction among Non-Separatists is the degree of belief they profess in the logical progression from the proposition that most environmental issues are Non-Separable, to the proposition that in practice all environmental controversies turn on "policy" questions, to the conclusion that science, and by implication, rational analysis itself, have little to contribute to the resolution of environmental problems. I reject this logic as a celebration of ignorance. Yet its importance as a factor in public debate cannot be denied. 30. "Our desire to have courts determine questions of law is related to a belief in their .. . expertness with regard to such questions. It is from that very desire that the nature of questions of be natural phenomena that can be described without any knowledge of law, 1 and it calls upon a reviewing court to assure itself that the decision under scrutiny is the result of reasoning from evidence, rather than the mere exercise of personal will. 2 That the functional prescriptions these solutions entail are so different, and their reconciliation empirically so difficult, 3 underlines the refractory character of the problem of separating fact from law. Nonetheless, advocates of "science courts"-institutions specifically designed to deal with factual technical issues-adopt a hybrid of the second and third approaches. They believe that it is possible to separate, on analytic grounds, pure scientific and engineering judgments from political, normative, and legal judgments 3 4 that can competently be made by appointed and elected officials. They further believe that Separation demands the creation of special fact-finding and fact-interpreting institutions. 3 Protection Agency (EPA), takes a similar Separatist position. He argues for a sharp distinction between two different governmental functions: "risk assessment," the objective, scientific activity that establishes the probabilities and consequences of exposure to chemicals and radiation; and "risk management," the core administrative activity, which should be governed by a common statutory formula for weighing risks against benefits in reaching regulatory decisions. 8 The importance of the issues and the weight of opinion behind the Separability thesis suggest that the thesis deserves both analytic and empirical tests. If the world is truly Separable, it should be possible logically to distinguish the technical and legal dimensions of environmental issues, and these distinctions should be manifest in the actual performance of institutions.
The Separatist argument is threefold. First, Separatists assert that it is possible, within the context of environmental controversies, to identify certain issues as "scientific" 8 7 and assign them to the appropriate nonpolitical institutions-if necessary creating institutions for that purpose. Second, Separatists claim that this assignment is responsive to democratic practices, in that once Separability has been achieved and purely technical questions have been answered, policy questions can be resolved by properly elected or appointed officials. , that responds in turn to a congressional inquiry whether "objective" risk assessment can be separated institutionally from "public and social policy decisions." Id. at 140. The panel urges regulatory agencies to maintain a "clear conceptual distinction" between risk assessment and risk management. Id. at 7. This suggests to Ruckelshaus that policy considerations need not and should not enter risk assessment. See Ruckelshaus, supra, at 1027-28 (if public suspects that policy considerations influence risk assessment, public confidence in regulatory decisions erodes). The National Research Council panel does not, however, argue that sharp conceptual distinctions between technical and political issues can be drawn. Rather, under the panel's definitions of those terms, risk management and risk assessment cut across science and policy. See RISK MGMT. REP., supra, at 33, 36-37, 48-49, 76-77, 142-43, 166-67.
Although the National Research Council panel and this Article share the view that technical and nontechnical questions are not separable, there are important differences between the two approaches. In general, the Report stresses functional-as distinct from substantive-separation of policy from science, see RISK MGMT. REP., supra, at 153-54, while this Article fully accepts substantive NonSeparability and calls for institutional innovations that encourage a controlled mixing of technical and political roles, see infra pp. 1328-30.
37. Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 506-07; Martin, supra note 35, at 1064; Science Court Task Force, supra note 35, at 654; cf. Mazur, supra note 35, at 11 (fact-value separation not fully possible; science court can and should attempt to resolve only those statements falsifiable using empirical data).
38. Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 505 (unthinkable in democratic society that scientists would be endowed with authority to assume full moral responsibility for science's social impact); Martin, supra note 35, at 1064 (science court proposal allocates scientific questions to experts, policy questions to public representatives); Science Court Task Force, supra note 35, at 653 (establishment of science court will allow ultimate social value questions to be settled by government or directly by voters).
of an adversary process. 3 9 These arguments have undeniable force. If the technical can be distinguished in practice from the legal and ethical, the principles of democratic government demand that Separation be enforced in order that properly chosen public officials make the legal, political, and ethical decisions that we have placed in their care. For if these distinctions go unenforced as technological decisions proliferate, experts gradually will assume greater roles in policymaking, boundaries of institutional authority will blur, and participatory government will be threatened. In a Separatist world, a powerful justification thus emerges for preserving the existing institutional balance, while creating new institutions that provide the necessary technical expertise.
Yet before establishing such institutions, a serious examination of assertedly separable issues is in order. It is true that there are scientific and engineering problems whose answers are central to environmental decisions and yet free of legal and ethical content. Given adequately specified assumptions, solutions of the partial differential equations describing the diffusion of air pollutants can be agreed upon, even when they bear upon the form and application of rules and procedures under the Clean Air Act-rules and procedures that affect almost every domestic industry. And it is possible in principle to construct models that enable estimation, apart from any ethical and legal considerations, of the atmospheric concentration of substances that can degrade the ozone layer or raise the global mean surface temperature. But the difficult environmental cases that regularly confront agencies and courts often turn on evidence of actual harm that is not immediately compelling-evidence based upon complex models whose validity cannot yet be tested directly; or upon statistical tests applied at the limits of detectability, in the absence of knowledge about the biological mechanisms by which harm may be caused. 40 Given the tenuous 39. Casper, supra note 35, at 32-33 (public adversary processes will: (1) allow technical experts to present analyses of social and political implications of new technology in institutional framework that does not presuppose experts' objectivity; (2) create genuine debate among experts, rather than encourage consensus of opinion; (3) create tradition of public dialogue that will combat secrecy and make whistleblowing unnecessary); Kantrowitz, supra note 35, at 507 (formal adversary process with scientifically sophisticated advocates and judges will "optimize objectivity" and lead to judgments that "forego . . . moral or political stands"); Martin, supra note 35, at 1074 (central purpose of science court proposal is to employ adversary process to uncover truth); Science Court Task Force, supra note 35, at 653 (procedures modeled on formal legal adjudication will enable emergence of "defensible, credible, technical bases for urgent policy decisions"). But see Sofaer, supra note 35, at 20-21 (adversary system places great weight on personal and verbal abilities of advocates; therefore, it is ill-suited to produce scientifically acceptable decisions).
40. Environmental decisions would be very different, though hardly easier if, for example, mechanisms for carcinogenesis were fully understood. For if so, while the demand for assessments of risk of the precise sort we now debate would gradually fade away, discussion would focus instead on whether the causal notions inherent in traditional formulas for legal and ethical responsibilities are transferable to biomedical and engineering contexts in which probabilities play important roles. nature of the technical evidence and the uncertainties about how actual injuries may occur, environmental controversies cannot be split into technical and legal parts. Environmental decisions then ultimately turn not on the substance of scientific questions, but on the procedures by which the significance of scientific evidence is evaluated-procedures integral, though in quite different senses, both to the administrative process and to scientific research.
Consider the hypothesis that workers exposed over many years to airborne benzene in concentrations of ten parts per million are twice as likely to suffer from leukemia as persons in the general population." 1 Separatists would characterize this hypothesis as a "scientific" question properly addressed by a technical advisory body.' Specifying the dose-incidence relationship' 3 for leukemia at low levels of benzene exposure is not, however, an ordinary scientific task. We do not yet know how leukemia is induced. Therefore, to infer a relationship between chronic low-level benzene exposure and leukemia is to make an assertion about statistical correlations, rather than biological mechanisms. Moreover, although statistical studies suggest that exposure to high concentrations of benzene, perhaps in combination with other factors, is associated with a significantly increased risk of leukemia,"' there are no precise incidence data at exposures as low as ten parts per million.' 5 The hypothesis that low-dose exposure to benzene significantly increases the risk of leukemia is therefore settled for regulatory purposes by weighing fragmentary, uncertain, and often contradictory pieces of epidemiological evidence bearing upon the occurrence of leukemia in small numbers of workers."' That this evidence is far from perfect does not vitiate the usefulness of detailed analysis. Experts can develop, perform, and analyze epidemiological surveys and animal experiments bearing upon toxicity. Given data from these surveys and experiments, they can formulate statistical tests and in principle control the "Type I" error of rejecting the hypothesis that 41. Cf Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Benzene) (invalidating OSHA's proposed reduction of benzene exposure standard from 10 parts per million to 1 part per million); see id. at 618 n.9 (first large-scale epidemiological study of benzene and leukemia found twofold increase in leukemia rate of exposed workers over rate in general population).
42. See Martin, supra note 35, at 1079; Mazur, supra note 35, at 10-11. But see McGarity, supra note 25, at 749-50 (to interpret cancer-related agency policy decisions as pure factual findings puts intolerable strain on traditional Separatist model of court-agency relationship).
43. The dose-incidence relations referred to here specify the percentage of an exposed population expected to suffer disease, given a specified exposure level. Setting a standard of proof is at once a device for controlling error and for assuring fairness. 50 It requires, for example, an assessment of the seriousness of the risk in question. 5 1 We regret any large-scale damage to public health or the environment. But it is nevertheless true that we are more willing to tolerate the risk of an error that causes the extinction of snail darters or bowhead whales than one that endangers human lives. 5 This distinction will be reflected in different standards of proof for evaluating proposals to lease offshore lands for oil exploration and for approving new food additives. 5 3
Setting a standard of proof requires, moreover, an appreciation of the difficulties of reaching definitive risk estimates. For example, a standard of proof that calls for unrealistically small "Type I" and "Type II" errors of 0.1% in setting a maximum occupational exposure of ten parts per million of benzene in air is no standard at all. It will be ignored in practice, to be replaced by other implicit rules that make regulatory decisions easier. Moreover, a standard of proof cannot reasonably be set without an appreciation of its consequences for the perceived fairness of the decisionmaking process. However carefully formulated, the hypothetical standard that accepts a greater margin for the error of incorrectly concluding that a substance poses negligible occupational risks when the workers at risk are poor and uneducated raises serious questions about the integrity of the resulting decisions. In sum, no one sensitive to the full implications of the endeavor can set a standard of proof for determining the riskiness of human exposure to a hazardous substance while neglecting either political or technical considerations. In that sense, setting a standard of proof is a non-Separable task. 54 One might suppose that there are common objectives in the weighing of evidence for pure scientific purposes and for regulatory purposes. In turn, these commonalities-allowing for the technical problems of adapting scientific language to a regulatory context-might assure that expert bodies can make judgments that are both scientifically defensible and useful in practical regulation. But this argument fails to confront important functional distinctions between scientific and legal evidence. Scientific evidence principally serves to define the limits of knowledge and help set directions for further work. Observing the remnants of the primordial universe, proving an outstanding conjecture in computation theory, or discovering the functions of a retrovirus, may provide spectacular confirmation of the vitality of science, enrich the researchers, or cure the sick. But these are not scientific concerns. The integrity of each scientific community depends on the limited use of the results of discovery to illuminate the intellectual future. Once the process of weighing evidence is set in the context of a societal decision, however, the direct impact of the evaluation does not fall only on the scientific community. Claims of right or of compensation for injury must then be addressed, and these evoke larger purposes: the objectives of protecting individual rights, assuring fairness, and preserving the integrity of the legal system. The same normative arguments that underlie Separatist theory tell us that these are not questions to which technical experts qua experts ought to speak.
Actual experience in resolving environmental controversies demonstrates that however attractive Separability is in theory, it has not been achieved in fact. Experts have not been restricted to technical matters, nor have generalist decisionmakers restricted themselves to legal and norma- 55 in which environmental groups and local, state, and federal agencies challenged the dumping of tailings from iron mining into Lake Superior. The plaintiffs argued that a low, though measurable, concentration of asbestiform fibers in local drinking water-contamination presumably resulting from the Reserve Mining Company's operations"'-endangered the citizens of Duluth, Minnesota.
Under a Separatist model, the standard of proof that such a risk has legal significance is set by statute, or failing that, by a court. 5 Moreover, in a Separatist world, judges do not make technical findings. In Reserve Mining, however, these limits were not respected. The federal district court retained its own expert medical witness to help it understand the evidence. Separatist theory notwithstanding, the court's expert formulated a standard of proof with immediate legal implications. In evaluating the risks to Duluth residents, he distinguished between "medical" and "scientific" proof. 58 He argued that scientific conclusions recognized as truth must meet numerical standards that are generally high, 59 and that proof of a medical risk requires a less stringent standard, based, as he put it, upon erring "on the side of what is best for the greatest number."" 0 The court of appeals accepted this argument, concluding that the asbestos contaminant "gives rise to a reasonable medical concern," "creates some health risk," and should be removed." 1 chemistry. 6 However, as in Reserve Mining, more persuasive than the biochemical evidence for the Ethyl court and the EPA was a body of epidemiological evidence bearing upon the health effects of lead at air concentrations commonly found in modern urban environments-levels much lower than those at which the classic symptoms of lead poisoning are observed. 6 6 The epidemiological evidence of harm was ambiguous. A major study of blood lead levels in seven major cities found no demonstrable association between atmospheric lead levels presumably resulting from gasoline combustion and average lead levels in the blood of local residents. 67 The EPA nevertheless decided to order the phaseout of the additives. In the agency's view, the lack of demonstrable environmental correlations in the seven cities study was outweighed by positive correlations detected in other studies. 6 The D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's position, 9 concluding that the agency had reasonably preferred the results of studies showing non-zero effects of low-level atmospheric lead, particularly in children living in city centers. 0 In situations with high uncertainty, said the court, the error of finding zero effect when an effect does exist is more probable than the error of labeling a harmless substance as toxic. 71 Furthermore, as in Reserve Mining, the Ethyl majority reached its own conclusions regarding issues that would be viewed as technical in a Separable world. By applying empirical data on blood lead levels following exposure to airborne lead, the court found that lead emissions in the atmosphere due to gasoline combustion "can make a significant contribution to blood lead levels" in the general population. 2 The court criticized the lack of controls on climatic conditions in epidemiological studies. 73 It also reached its own judgment on the relative weight that should be accorded to the various epidemiologic and clinical studies.
74
Ethyl's conclusion regarding the relative significance of positive and negative epidemiological evidence turns in effect not only on the court's This discussion does not suggest that the federal courts have acted improperly in reviewing environmental decisions. While the cases discussed above display unusual functional relationships among courts, agencies, and experts, they do not conflict with accepted judicial practices. Judges may properly reach a considered judgment that a court should, even unaided, take the inferential leap from scientific argument to legal conception. 9 These cases illustrate instead the evolutionary process by which science is gradually and haltingly assimilated into law . 4 They demonstrate that the distinction between scientific and legal issues is arbitrary and unworkable. The questions raised are deeper than whether useful distinctions can be drawn between technical and legal matters. Rather, as in the New Deal era, the modern environmental controversy challenges us to shape the changing roles of institutions. 
91.
Compare 685 F.2d at 478-81 (Bazelon, J.) (finding NRC zero-risk conclusion represents "self-evident error in judgment") and id. at 481-86 (holding zero-risk conclusion improperly excludes uncertain environmental costs of nuclear waste disposal from consideration in individual reactor licensing) with International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in result) (denying legality and utility of judicial exploration of technical intricacies of agency decisions and urging instead judicial establishment of procedural guidelines). 
See 685 F.2d at

Ill.
The failure of forms of Separability based either upon a substantive distinction between fact and law, or upon a normative restriction on the scope of judicial review, threatens the traditional structure of administrative law. Yet this structure may be preserved in other ways. An alternative model builds in a different way upon the functional and normative distinctions between fact-finding and lawmaking. 9 5 This model gives a special interpretation to agency predictions based upon evidence on the frontiers of science and technology. It views these predictions as policy judgments relatively insulated from judicial oversight. 9 8 In addition to their "ordinary" legal and factual dimensions, environmental decisions are taken in this alternative to have a characteristic core involving uncertain scientific evidence and specification of the maximum risks society will tolerate. 97 Under the model, the responsibility for dealing with this core is assigned solely to administrative policymakers.
The deferential approach to "quasi-legislative" policymaking reflects historical practice 98 and is widely followed. In principle, it enables the flexible response to scientific and technological change that Frankfurter envisioned. '0 0 For as discovery and innovation proceed, the model of deference to administrative predictions can adjust the boundary between "ordinary" fact-finding and "quasi-legislative" judgment and thereby alter the functional relationships among institutions. Whether such a dynamic approach will succeed is an open question. It remains to be seen whether as agencies grow more sophisticated in facing reviewing courts, they defeat 99. Indeed, the Court has effectively elevated the deference model to a higher status, forbidding as a violation of the bicameral and presentation requirements, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3, Congress' attempts to manage its delegation of authority in a complex society through the use of a veto power over administrative actions. See INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2804 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Chadha may well contribute to the ever-enlarging sphere of executive autonomy. Yet in an era in which agency regulations have been given the formal imprimatur of legislation, see Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1981), and high technology tends to isolate agency decisions from review, see infra pp. 1325-26, restoring the balance of power among institutions is an objective that deserves first priority.
100. See supra p. 1300.
the adaptive process, increasing their discretionary powers by drawing more of the real substance of decisions into a realm that plausibly can be described as the scientific and technological frontier. 1 The recent stages of the phoenix-like Vermont Yankee litigation 0 2 provide some insight into the desirability of special judicial deference to agency predictions. The facts merit a brief review. 03 In the military phase of the atomic energy program, experts recognized that, as a result of their toxicity, reactor wastes demand special disposal measures. 0 4 Yet no disposal technology was created. Nor did Congress give the AEC, or later the commercial nuclear industry, incentives to find solutions to the waste problem.
10 5 In 1972, the AEC instituted a generic rulemaking 0 6 to decide how its boards hearing individual reactor licensing proceedings should treat the storage and disposal of spent fuel. On the basis of this rulemaking, the NRC, which assumed the AEC's regulatory responsibilities during the fuel cycle hearings,"' concluded that burial of high-level and transuranic wastes would not result in the release of toxic materials. The Commission summarized its conclusions in a wastes from permanent disposal facilities. Hearing boards considering reactor licensing applications therefore did not take into account in their cost-benefit balancing the uncertain environmental costs associated with the development and subsequent operation of geologic nuclear waste repositories. Judge Bazelon's approach in Vermont Yankee III directly conflicts with the model of deference to quasi-legislative predictions. After scrutinizing the substance of the agency's decision, he concluded that the NRC's zero-risk finding was a "self-evident" error 1 9 in light of considerable evidence of uncertainties in the long-term environmental consequences of the burial of nuclear wastes. Judge Bazelon characterized as equally unsatis- On the other hand, Judge Wilkey, dissenting, fully adopted the deferential model." 2 " He argued that the NRC evaluated evidence on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and that its prediction with respect to repository performance is precisely that type of "legislative policymaking" that deserves special deference. Judge Wilkey argued further that nuclear waste disposal does not pose major risks, and that the NRC's decision to remove the back end of the fuel cycle from consideration in individual reactor licensing proceedings therefore represented a reasonable exercise of discretion.
1 2 In Vermont Yankee IV,' 2 5 a unanimous Supreme Court followed Judge Wilkey's reasoning and upheld the NRC's action. The Court characterized the Commission's approach as a reasonable one that balanced optimism over future repository performance in containing solid reactor wastes with cautious assumptions that all radioactive gases entrained in the wastes will escape before a repository is sealed.' 26 Explicitly affirming the model of deference to quasi-legislative agency findings, the Court reminded the lower court that the NRC's predictions lay "within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science," and that under such circumstances, "a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential. One does not come away from a reading of Vermont Yankee III and Vermont Yankee IV with confidence in the usefulness of judicial deference to quasi-legislative predictions. 28 128. Nor does the performance of the parties encourage optimism about the prospects of using the traditional adversary process to resolve complex environmental disputes. As in earlier phases of this litigation, see Yellin, supra note 101, at 546-48, the parties were not helpful to the courts. The NRDC attacked the form of the Commission's finding, rather than its substance. Environmental Decisionmaking Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee IV fully understood the implications of its application of the deference model for public acceptance of important environmental decisions. First, the Court did not recognize that the NRC's final rule did not directly address the public's concerns over nuclear waste. The Court declared itself impressed with the reasonableness of the Commission's "risk-averse" environmental assessment of the uranium fuel cycle. 129 Yet the balance in the NRC's "balanced" view ignored the long-term risks of repository leakage that are central to the nuclear waste debate. Considering, as the Commission did, whether a small volume of radioactive gases will be released before a repository is sealed is not the same as considering the possibility, however distant, that highly toxic fission products and heavy elements will be released in large volume into the biosphere over the millennia during which such wastes remain hazardous for direct human exposure. 13 Second, the Court failed to recognize that the Commission's zero-risk finding does not provide basic information critical for defensible risk analysis. Exploration and understanding of uncertainty are essential to good scientific research, to competent epidemiologic analysis, and to convincing econometric and cost-benefit studies of the type now often central to regulatory decisions. In these fields, depth of insight is achieved through an understanding of uncertainties and of their implications for further research. While an agency's risk estimates cannot always be judged using the standards of basic science, at a minimum an agency's treatment of uncertainty should be consistent with the best academic practice in the relevant fields. In Vermont Yankee, this consistency was lacking. The general theory of decisionmaking under uncertainty calls for decisions based on consideration of the details of social or individual preferences. In particular, if no special assumptions are made about the distribution of 44 Fed. Reg. 45,362, 45,363, 45,365 (1979). As Commissioner Gilinsky pointed out, id. at 45,374, this suggestion obscures the real implications of the fuel cycle debate. No universal yardstick can accurately measure the costs and benefits of fuel cycle activities and evaluate them in the context of other environmental and economic considerations routinely considered in every licensing action. A licensing board can decide whether the net benefits of reactor operation outweigh the putative costs associated with the fuel cycle. But given the crude decision instruments at hand, to declare that the risks of nuclear waste disposal tilt the cost-benefit balance against one reactor is also to say that no reactor should be built or operated. See id. at 45,374 & n.1. It is naive to suppose that any NRC hearing board would reach such a decision. Vermont Yankee III and Vermont Yankee IV are therefore shadow versions of the debate about the legitimacy and long-term viability of the commercial nuclear power industry in which the courts have no institutional role. decision outcomes or social preferences, there is no logically consistent decision rule that gives uncertainties zero weight. Yet uncertainties were given zero weight in computing the risk estimates the NRC presented in all three versions of the fuel cycle rule at issue in the Vermont Yankee litigation."' In responding critically to the Commission's zero-risk finding, Judge Bazelon therefore restated a rationality requirement of the most fundamental and important sort. 1 32
Nor does Vermont Yankee IV contribute to the balance among institutions essential to a healthy administrative system. The modern model of separated and divided powers calls for constructive cooperation among the legislature, agencies, and courts. 133 132. Vermont Yankee III is best read as suggesting that NEPA requires decisionmakers to incorporate in their environmental statements explicit rules for relatively weighting point estimates of risk and the associated uncertainties. In light of this interpretation, Vermont Yankee IV's rejection of Judge Bazelon's attack on the Commission's zero-risk rule is understandable. For although his arguments have merit as general propositions about the necessity for explicit treatment of environmental uncertainties, his approach to risk analysis is analytically unconvincing. "Risk" is not an observable entity. It is a concept that is defined by specifying a rule or reasoning process that combines observable components, such as the probability of a future event and its consequences, into a measure of risk. Yet Judge Bazelon directly equated uncertainties in the future environmental effects of nuclear waste disposal with "environmental costs," NRC v. NRDC, 685 F. IV) , without displaying the risk-building rule used to effect this transformation. Nor does Judge Bazelon make clear why he believes future fuel cycle effects must be entered on the cost side of the ledger. While it is true that reprocessing of spent fuel is now generally seen as economically infeasible and environmentally inadvisable, that position may change in the future with technological developments or shifts in energy policies.
Moreover, in another part of his argument, Judge Bazelon adopted a simple, widely used approach that equates risk with the product "probability" times "consequences," 685 F.2d at 478-79 & n.100. Thus, he identified risk with the summary statistic "expected costs. Yankee IV's impeccable logic strikes a discordant note. For rather than taking the broad view essential for dispassionate oversight, the Court reads the NRC's decision in isolation from past AEC and NRC actions. It interprets the Commission's findings as a limited response to the anticipated performance of one disposal alternative-the placement of wastes in bedded salt. 134 And ignoring the plain words of the Commission's justification for the final rule, 135 it reads into the NRC's decision the conclusion that the uncertainties associated with waste repository performance "are not sufficient to affect the outcome" of individual reactor licensing actions. 13 On this limited view, the Commission's decision is clearly supportable. Yet the Court's narrow reasoning demonstrates that the deference model is hollow. For Vermont Yankee IV sets no standard of agency behavior, but instead disrupts the institutional balance by reaffirming the Court's past practice 1 7 of blocking judicial oversight of nuclear power regulation. 1 38 In sum, the record suggests the Court has been insensitive to the implications of Vermont Yankee IV for the legitimacy of the administrative process. This insensitivity is twofold. First, the Court has allowed its concern for the vitality of one important industry to override established procedural safeguards. Absent the forthright analysis of relevant uncertainties, numerical point estimates do not convey to decisionmakers and the public any sense of the seriousness of environmental hazards. 3 9 The Court's approval of the NRC's zero-risk finding therefore conflicts with the settled rule that an administrative record must be sufficiently complete to permit effective review and efficient regulation, to be fair to regulatees, and to enable the education of the public and its officials. 140 Second, the Court has failed to respond to a shift in the public's perception of the nature of environmental decisions. As biological discoveries provide us with a deeper understanding of health risks, society's view of the class of such risks important enough to deserve a response from government broadens."" In consequence, environmental decisions that once would have been seen as purely social and technological have now taken on the attributes of decisions affecting the personal safety and integrity of citizens qua individual citizens. Clarity and fullness of explanation are central to the legitimacy of decisions affecting individual health and safety, 4 2 and therefore to the legitimacy of the associated decision process. Once environmental decisions lose their pure social and technological character and take on the attributes of decisions directly affecting important individual interests, the same fullness of explanation becomes central to the legitimacy of the administrative state. 143. Sound economic reasoning also supports a requirement that technological decisions be fully explained. Efficient, fair operation of our mixed economy demands that private parties be free, once regulatory ground rules have been set, to act in their own best interests. They cannot do so effectively without knowing the details of the logic underlying administrative predictions. Moreover, we expect technological innovation in response to the need for better environmental controls. difficult substantive questions, and therefore in achieving legitimacy,' technical communities should directly participate in decisionmaking; and (5) to be clearly perceived as legitimate and avoid interference with ordinary constitutional functions, the power of any new institution should flow from its personnel and the persuasiveness of its arguments, not from the direct delegation of authority.
With these requirements in mind, I have three suggestions. First, I propose the creation of a hybrid institution combining executive and legislative branch decisionmakers"' with experts from outside government. Under this proposal, the President would appoint a commission that would include the chairmen of the Council for Environmental Quality and the Council of Economic Advisors, the president of the National Academy of Sciences, the Attorney General, and selected members of Congress. The commission would also include rotating representatives from the biological, physical science, and engineering communities. The agency heads concerned would sit as ad hoc commission members. This commission would be charged with a scheduled review of environmental programs and would give special attention to areas in which scientific knowledge and technical data are incomplete. It would recommend large-scale policy choices and programs for future actions contingent on the results of ongoing research. 6 2 It would formulate proposals for updating environmental statutes and transmit these proposals to the relevant congressional committees. The commission's enabling legislation would include procedures to assure floor consideration of its proposals during the year in which they are presented to Congress. This proposal does not shift the burden of inertia" 6 or force Congress' hand. Yet it is likely to provoke constructive action. The commissioners will be adept at addressing both political and technical problems. They will be insulated from the immediate pressures of policymaking and can avoid the pitfalls of long-term decisionmaking driven solely by crisis. 18 ' Second, I propose creating surrogates for democratic representation within the regulatory agencies. The Separatists' conclusions may be incorrect, 6 8 but they do us a service by pointing out that in the absence of practical distinctions between the technical and the political, nothing prevents administrators from using their discretion gradually to draw political decisions under the cloak of expertise, effectively precluding public participation in environmental decisions. 167 A surrogate for democratic decisionmaking can be constructed by taking advantage of the contrast in styles and intellectual approaches among the technical disciplines. 168 One attractive alternative is to use two different planning groups within each agency, one based intellectually in economics, the other in biology. 69 Experience suggests that the economic planners will attempt to minimize the quantifiable costs of proposed regulations 170 through the use of price incentives.
17 1 In contrast, the biological planners will tend to emphasize extrapolation to man from the results of in vitro toxicity experiments, animal models, or known effects of chemicals and radiation in simple or- The energy of the clash between biological and physical science research philosophies could have profitably been called upon at different stages in the nuclear safety debate by including biologists in discussions otherwise reserved for physicists and engineers. In response to continuing debate about the reliability of the methodology and arguments used by the NRC in assessing the risks of nuclear power, the Commssion created an ad hoc review group. See AD HOG RISK ASSESSMENT REVIEW GROUP, REPORT TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1978) (NRC Consultant's Report NUREG/CR-0400). Although much of the required analysis concerned the health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation, no biologists participated. Thus, the NRC did not take advantage of the advice of researchers with a commitment to understanding diverse living systems through laboratory analysis, rather than achieving the physical scientist's ultimate goal of simplicity and depth of theoretical understanding. ganisms, 1 72 and exhibit a countervailing preference for health-based standards and direct regulation. Under this proposal, the two planning groups would report independently on identical policy questions formulated by the agency head. Agencies could then regulate in light of two alternative sets of findings that would be part of the public record. The quality of ultimate decisions, in light of comments from the technical and social science communities and the results of judicial review, should make the burdens and benefits of this experiment clear.
This suggestion moves the administrative process away from the centralized models for regulatory reform that have frequently been proposed.
17 3 The rationale for centralized regulation is increased efficiency, stability, and predictability of decisions. One can argue that competition breeds instability; that a public clash of views detracts from the legitimacy of decisions; 17 4 that duplication creates conflict that inevitably leads to inferior decisions shaped by advocacy, bargaining, and compromise, rather than by substance; and therefore that the resulting administrative process would be unable to respond to discovery and innovation. I am persuaded, however, that innovations of this kind can increase flexibility and speed decisionmaking by encouraging an earlier, more open debate over the substance of technological decisions within the agencies, rather than in the White House, Congress, and the courts. The costs of internalizing dis- at 1359 (comparing etiology of liver tumors in man and rodents, and concluding observed similarities support extrapolation from animals to man). Of course, attitudes toward environmental regulation within biology and economics differ, and personnel choices must insure that an agency has a roughly balanced pair of planning views.
The proposal does not rely upon modification of the existing advisory system. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 656 (1976) (National Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety and Health); 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1976) (NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards); 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (1983) (standing FDA advisory committees). When constituted without regard to the institutional affiliations of prospective members, advisory committees are often useful in bringing a deeper perspective to an agency's technical analysis. But they can also lead to nonconstructive posturing and confrontation. Compare T. Greenwood, Knowledge and Discretion in Regulation 173-74 (1983) (unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal) (narrowly focused EPA Science Advisory Board deliberations have improved agency risk assessments, helped identify and sometimes resolve controversies, correct technical errors) with id. at 174 (statutory instruction to constitute OSHA advisory committees with balance of employer and employee viewpoints provided little more than forum for contention and only rarely helped agency in risk assessment or engineering analyses of regulatory options). The emphasis here is upon institutional reforms that integrate dissonant professional views within an agency.
173. E.g., COMM'N ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, supra note 27, at 79-88; Cutler, supra note 27, at 553; Cutler & Johnson, supra note 27, at 1414-17. See generally S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 359-60 (describing proposals to give President veto power over administrative action).
174. Cf Ruckelshaus, supra note 36, at 1028 (public interest not served when federal agencies openly disagree on hazards of same substance). agreements within agencies may well be outweighed by the benefits of a multi-disciplinary approach that encourages more open choices among diverse values, and revitalizes representative government. 17 5 Finally, a review of the last two environmental decades suggests that our nineteenth-century system of judicial oversight needs help if it is to deal competently with the problems of twentieth-century technological society." A science advisory body for the federal judiciary could provide that help. Elsewhere, I have suggested one model, in which an advisory group of standing masters is associated with the federal appellate courts. 7 This proposal seeks to encourage a critical, continuing dialogue between the scientific and engineering communities and the courts. Judges could call upon the masters in complex cases presenting issues on the frontiers of research and innovation. I conceive of a two-stage proceeding. The first stage would focus, consistent with present master's practices, 178 on technical questions proposed by the court. In the second stage, the masters would examine the appellate record in the context of the whole case, giving thought to open scientific questions, discussing these questions informally with appropriate members of the technical community, and reporting to the court on the implications of their studies for future litigation.' 7 9
Some may prefer that the courts sharply limit their role in environmental controversies, 8° effectively withdrawing from technological decisionmaking, but that is not a realistic prospect. Cases that inextricably mix the legal and technical will continue to test the judicial system. Generalist judges will continue to define government's responsibilities in adjusting to technological change and to strike a balance between the use of new technology and the preservation of otherwise immutable values. 1 81 Moreover, the demise of the legislative veto 82 can only intensify the pressures on Congress to revert to practices of an earlier era' 1 3 and give detailed environmental instructions it could otherwise have left unspecified,' M ultimately drawing the courts deeper into reviewing the substance of environmental decisions.
We should have no qualms about the modest changes in the scope of the judicial role that these proposals entail. There is no evidence that judges, given the opportunity, can or will take control over environmental policy. Indeed, their reluctance to do so is manifest. 1 8 5 Nor is it likely that judges will allow expert advisors to exercise judicial power.
The introduction of informal procedures into the appellate process will restrict the rights and protections guaranteed by the formal adversary system. Yet making environmental decisionmaking less formal is not necessarily undesirable. That the traditional party-controlled process is used for environmental decisionmaking, despite the restrictions imposed by justiciability, is less evidence of concern for individual rights than recognition of the seriousness of the issues. In effect, we have used the adversary system to make environmental decisions as an experiment in ways to make wiser long-term choices. The adversary system is not, however, an essential source of legitimacy for technological decisions. On the contrary, in technical controversies, scathing superficial questioning by counsel intent on winning a case increases skepticism about the usefulness and legitimacy of the formal adversary process and discourages expert participation. 188 Moreover, while party control of legal controversies induces lawyers' support for the judicial system, legitimacy does not flow from a process in which important environmental decisions are shaped by lawyers whose training, predilections, and skills are not attuned to the issues of central importance. Nor is legitimacy enhanced when simplistic analyses of complex environmental problems 18 7 or encyclopedic treatment of peripheral issues 88 are encouraged. When sophisticated technical language and art play central roles in the substance of decision, when more is needed than simple judgments of whether policy analysts have considered all important factors,"" or when decisions turn on deductions from complex models, 190 substance-independent adversary techniques at best give the imprimatur, not the reality, of independent oversight. 91 The essential task is to enable a form of judicial review that can maintain a balance among law-enforcing, law-interpreting, and law-making institutions. In an era of discovery and innovation, achieving such a balance demands the thorough integration of scientific judgment into the judicial process. Resolution of the antinomy 92 between independent judicial review and
